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Twenty-seven years ago, codifying the common-law rules of
evidence provided numerous immediate benefits. Today, however,
we have experienced changes in the realities of litigation (e.g.,
modem discovery rules and the exigencies resulting from "rocket
dockets"), and significant advancements in technology. The critical
mass of these developments has and will continue to expose flaws
inherent in the current codified system of rules. Indeed, because the
quasi-legislative body responsible for the growth and development of
the transplanted rules fails to reassess them regularly and
comprehensively, the burgeoning problems created by codification
can only worsen.
Central to this paper is the notion that replacing the common-law
method for developing evidentiary principles on a case-by-case basis
requires attention to all developing needs, not just those currently
causing serious problems. Like the engine of an automobile, the rules
by which the engine of justice is driven cannot continue to run well
With just oil changes and minor adjustments. Preventive maintenance
* Mr. Rice is a Professor of Law and Director of the Evidence Project at the
American University Washington College of Law. Recently he has authored BEST KEPT
SECRETS OF EVIDENCE LAW: 101 PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES & PITFALLS (Anderson
2001); EVIDENCE: COMMON LAW AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (LEXIS 4th
ed. 2000); ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES (West Group 2d ed.
1999); and ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: STATE LAW (Rice Publishing 2002). The last
two listed publications can be found at http://www.acprivilege.com.
I would like to acknowledge the substantive comments of Professors David
Aaronson, Walter Effross, and Eileen Scallen. Their ideas significantly contributed to the
development of this paper. I also wish to thank my Dean's Fellows Ben Saul and Slade
Cutter for their excellent editorial assistance.
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must be practiced. Periodically, every major component must be
examined for purposes of overhaul or replacement. Even the design
of the machine itself must occasionally be reassessed in fight of its
overall performance.
Part I of this paper outlines the history of the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence. Part II examines the
benefits and drawbacks to the codification of the common-law rules
of evidence, especially when viewed in light of the Advisory
Committee process to which their maintenance has been delegated.
Part III briefly addresses how the Advisory Committee fails to act
independently, deferring instead to the Chief Justice's desire to limit
the Committee's law reform activities. Part IV offers specific
proposals for change.
I. A Brief History of the Advisory Committee
Through the Rules Enabling Act,1 Congress delegated to the
Supreme Court the responsibility for maintaining all procedural
codes, including the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court assigned
this responsibility to the Judicial Conference of the United States,2
which now has responsibility for maintaining all of the procedural
codes Congress has adopted. Within the Judicial Conference, this
responsibility has been assigned to the Committee on Practice and
Procedure and, in turn, to Advisory Committees for each procedural
code.
For the first twenty years after enacting the Federal Rules of
Evidence in 1974, a Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee
did not exist. Responsibility for maintaining the evidence code was
added to those of the Advisory Committees on the Federal Rules of
Civil and Criminal Procedure. In those Committees, the Evidence
Code received little attention.
Not until 1992, at the urging of many individuals, including Chief
Judge Edward Becker of the Third Judicial Circuit and Professor
Aviva Orenstein,3 was the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 331(establishing judicial conference).
3. See Edward R. Becker and Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After
Sixteen Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules,
142 F.R.D. 519 (1992), also printed in 60 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 857 (1992) [hereinafter
Becker & Orenstein] (identifying a then trend in the Supreme Court decisions "toward a
plain meaning" interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 142 F.R.D. at 526;
suggesting that trend might stultify reform in evidence law, noting that Congress lacked
"sufficient institutional interest.., to pursue the job" of remedying problems, id. at 572;
and, as a result of such factors, asserting that an advisory committee was the best vehicle
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53
PRETENDING FOR THE FUTURE
Committee established. The Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court appoints all members of this Committee.4
The Advisory Committee proposes revisions to the rules, holds
public hearings and reports any approved change to the Rules
Committee.5 If that Committee approves the change, in whole or in
part, the change is reported to the full Judicial Conference. Approval
of the full Judicial Conference must be followed by approval from the
Supreme Court (a review that, usually, is pro forma). From the
Supreme Court, the change is sent to Congress. Congress can reject
the change (a rare occurrence), explicitly approve it (even more rare),
or do nothing (the usual course). Congress' inaction functions as an
implicit approval of the change, which then becomes effective in the
month of December following the "approval."
This is the process that has been substituted for development of
evidentiary principles through judicial decisions under the common
law.
H. From Common Law to Codification
The move from the common-law method of developing
evidentiary rules on a case-by-case basis to a codified system of rules
has had both positive and negative consequences. On the positive
side, codification established a uniform code of evidence throughout
the federal judicial system, eliminating dependence on the evidence
rules of each state in which the federal district courts sit. Codification
also provided a model for state adoptions, facilitating consistency in
evidence rules both among the states and between the federal and
state systems.
On the negative side, the shift from a common law to a codified
system has changed the dynamic of the evolution of evidentiary
principles. Evidentiary rules are now the product of a quasi-
legislative process. No longer do the equities of the unique
evidentiary circumstances of particular cases control the development
of evidentiary rules.
The Advisory Committee's involvement with the Code has been
a serious disappointment in a number of ways. First, the Committee
has focused its attention too narrowly, confining itself to a few types
of issues, such as those that its members considered the most
compelling problems for the courts.6 The Committee also focuses on
for promoting the cause of evidence reform because such a committee could engage in
"responsible monitoring and selective revision" of the Federal Rules, id at 570).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 331.
5. Id.
6. For example, whether FED. R. EVID. 609, impeachment by evidence of prior
convictions, is modified by FED. R. EviD. 403.
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issues of personal interest to members of the Committee, even if
these issues have not caused serious problems for the courts.7 Finally,
the Committee focuses on issues of concern to members of Congress
and special interest groups that make proposals to and advocate
before the Committee-influencing decisions in a way that would not
have been possible under the common-law case-by-case
decisionmaking process because they would have had no standing to
participate.8
The second drawback to the Advisory Committee's involvement
with the code has been the serious delay in addressing outstanding
issues. Because the needs of pending cases do not drive rule
evaluations, issues can linger, remaining unaddressed by the Advisory
Committee for decades.9 The members of the Advisory Committee
7. For example, adding to FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) the clause that precludes courts
from relying exclusively on the contents of the statements under consideration to
determine agency for vicarious admissions.
8. For example, the multiple revisions that have been made to Rule 412, addressing
the admissibility of past sexual behavior of alleged victims of sexual offenses. These
revisions were the result of pressure by women's organizations on both Congress and the
Advisory Committee. Fortunately, unlike other revisions to the evidence rules enacted by
Congress, the revisions to Rule 412 originated in the Advisory Committee, and therefore,
were more carefully drafted than revisions originating outside the process established by
the Rules Enabling Act.
9. The following are some examples: (1) If statements are classified as exclusions
from the definition of hearsay, FED. R. EVID. 801(d), rather than as exceptions to the
hearsay rule, FED. R. EvID. 803, 804, because their admissibility is not based on their
inherent reliability, why are Ancient Documents and the new hearsay exception,
Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, codified as exceptions in FED.R.EVID. 803, 804(b)(6)? (2)
FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(B) completely excludes matters observed by law enforcement
personnel from criminal trials (the defendant cannot even offer them against the
government), but 803(8)(C) permits findings of fact that are not based on personal
knowledge to be used against the government. This inconsistency gives the least reliable
statements the greatest admissibility. (3) FED. R. EVID. 602 requires witnesses to testify
on the basis of personal knowledge. The only exception delineated in the Rules is
testimony by expert witnesses under FED. R. EVID. 703. Despite the omission, vicarious
admissions under Rule 801(d)(2) have never required that the agent be shown to have
possessed personal knowledge. (4) FED. R. EvID. 704 explicitly precludes only expert
witnesses from testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant.
Presumably, therefore, lay witnesses could testify to such matters. However, the last
sentence conflicts with the explicit language at the beginning by providing that the issues
of mental state or condition "are matters for the trier of fact alone." (5) There is no bias
rule and the courts have been in conflict over whether a foundation is required. Those
requiring a foundation have relied upon FED. R. EVID. 613 for authority, which addresses
prior inconsistent statements, but that rule has eliminated the foundation requirement. (6)
FED. R. EVID. 803(22) permits only judgments of conviction in criminal felony cases to be
admitted to prove facts essential to sustain that judgment. The conclusions reached in all
civil cases are not admissible under the hearsay exception, but inconsistently Rule 803(8)
permits findings from government agency investigations to come into evidence even
though the rules of evidence were not followed in the proceedings leading to those
findings and the same procedural due process was not afforded all participants. Another
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have offered many reasons for failing to address issues. They have
argued that these issues are not creating problems serious enough to
consume the limited time that the Committee members have to
devote to Committee work." Committee members have said that
they are concerned that their changes will create more problems than
they solve.1' The Chief Justice, meanwhile, has emphasized to
Committee chairs that he would like to see minimal revisions-only
those changes necessary to resolve the most compelling problems-
nothing that could be considered law reform." As a consequence, this
inconsistency is that FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) permits the admissions of a party
through a guilty plea to come into evidence, but the misdemeanor judgment based on that
plea is inadmissible. (7) Expert opinion testimony is admitted at trial solely for the
purpose of assisting the jury in arriving at factual conclusions. Nevertheless, FED. R.
EVID. 703 permits experts to rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence that the jury may
never be permitted to hear. Therefore it is common for experts to testify to conclusions
that they would not be willing to reach if they were limited to the evidence that the jury is
permitted to hear. For a comprehensive discussion of these and other issues, see P.R.
RICE & W. DELKER, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE: A
SHORT HISTORY OF Too LITrLE CONSEQUENCE, 191 F.R.D. 678 (2000); Paul R. Rice,
The Evidence Project: Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules of Evidence with
Supporting Commentary, 171 F.R.D. 330 (1997), available at
wcl.american.edu/pub/journals/evidence.
10. Letter from Peter G. McCabe, Secretary, Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, to Paul R. Rice, Professor of
Law, American University Washington College of Law (Nov. 14. 1997) (on file with
author). This may explain why the split of authority over the scope of FED. R. EVID. 408,
Compromise and Offers to Compromise, remains unaddressed. Rule 408 states only that
compromise offers and accompanying statements are "not admissible" to prove liability
for a claim. By contrast, FED. R. EVID. 410, Inadmissibility of Pleas, Plea Discussions, and
Related Statements, states that such offers and statements made in the context of criminal
plea negotiations are "not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the
defendant." A small number of courts have been split over whether civil compromise
statements in FED. R. EVID. 408 are later admissible in criminal proceedings, since the
explicit exclusion from both is missing. Compare United States v. Skeddle, 176 F.R.D.
254, 256-57 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (excluding such statements in subsequent criminal
proceedings), with United States v. Prewitt, 34 F.3d 436, 439 (7th Cir. 1994) and United
States v. Gonzalez, 748 F.2d 74,78 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that Rule 408 does not prohibit
the receipt of such evidence in criminal proceedings).
11. See letter from Peter G. McCabe, supra, fn. 10. Although the Committee
identified several rules that could be clarified or simplified, it decided to engage the
rulemaking process only if it was necessary to obviate a 'real' problem. In many instances,
the Committee concluded that the bar and bench have coped with the minor problems
caused by the wording of a particular rule. On balance, such minor problems were
insufficient to initiate the rulemaking process, especially when an amendment would
generate uncertainty and create litigation regarding its meaning. The inevitable
disadvantages in perfecting a rule often outweighed any modest advantages gained in
simplifying or clarifying it.
12. Telephone Interviews with Judge Fern Smith and Judge Ralph Winter, former




attitude toward change has prevailed throughout the Committee's
existence.
Committee members have chosen to interpret their legislative
mandate as authorizing them only to maintain the code that was
adopted in 1974."3 The language of the Act, however, does not justify,
and certainly does not compel, such a restrictive interpretation. The
only evidence rules the Committee is not authorized to create or
modify without an explicit act of Congress are those rules relating to
privilege. 4
The Chief Justice's attitude is somewhat understandable, when considered in light of
the negative impact that followed the significant changes to the discovery rules made by
the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure more than a decade ago. See
generally, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 507 (1993)
(Scalia, J., dissenting), Linda S. Mullinex, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of
Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1393 (1994).
13. Relevant provisions of the Rules Enabling Act provide as follows:
§ 331. Judicial Conference of the United States
The [Judicial] Conference shall... carry on a continuous study of the
operation and effect of the general rules of practice and procedure now or
hereafter in use as prescribed by the Supreme Court for the other courts of
the United States pursuant to law. Such changes in and additions to those
rules as the Conference may deem desirable to promote simplicity in
procedure, fairness in administration, the just determination of litigation,
and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay shall be
recommended by the Conference from time to time to the Supreme Court
for its consideration and adoption, modification or rejection, in accordance
with law.
28 U.S.C. § 331 (2001)
§ 2073. Rules of procedure and evidence; method of prescribing
(a)(1) The Judicial Conference shall prescribe and publish the procedures
for the consideration of proposed rules under this section. (2) The Judicial
Conference may authorize the appointment of committees to assist the
Conference by recommending rules to be prescribed under sections 2072
and 2075 of this title. Each such committee shall consist of members of the
bench and the professional bar, and trial and appellate judges.
(b) The Judicial Conference shall authorize the appointment of a standing
committee on rules of practice, procedure, and evidence under subsection
(a) of this section. Such standing committee shall review each
recommendation of any other committees so appointed and recommend to
the Judicial Conference rules of practice, procedure, and evidence and such
changes in rules proposed by a committee appointed under subsection (a)(2)
of this section as may be necessary to maintain consistency and otherwise
promote the interest of justice.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2073a-2073b (2001).
14. § 2074. Rules of procedure and evidence; submission to Congress; Effective Date
(a) The Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May I of the
year in which a rule prescribed under section 2072 is to become effective a copy
of the proposed rule. Such rule shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of
the year in which such rule is so transmitted unless otherwise provided by law.
The Supreme Court may fix the extent such rule shall apply to proceedings then
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While the Committee insists it regularly reviews all of the
Evidence Rules to determine which, if any, need to be amended, the
Committee's self-imposed restrictions have amounted to a shopworn
philosophy: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it."15  This may be an
acceptable management philosophy in the day-to-day, or perhaps
even year-to-year, operations of the Committee. When, however,
"broke" is narrowly interpreted over a period of decades to mean
"stopping traffic," too many loose ends of the code remain
unaddressed.
Further, Committee members take the position that when
deficient rules were enacted outside the process of the Rules
Enabling Act, it would offend Congress or exceed the Committee's
legislative mandate for the Committee to amend those rules. 6
Meanwhile, Committee members have delayed taking action on
rules because they want to see how judges handle the problem." This
"wait and see" approach is a bit perverse given our codified system.
On the one hand, for the sake of consistency, the codified rules
deprive the trial judge of the authority to deal effectively with
evidentiary problems. Judges no longer have the right to amend rules
by initiating a different practice. Yet, when a codified rule proves
inadequate, the Advisory Committee's reluctance to take corrective
measures, paradoxically, relies on judges to correct problems in the
evidence code. The Committee, therefore, places judges in the ironic
position of having to exercise rule-making authority they no longer
possess, in an effort to correct problems forced on them by the code
that eliminated their authority.
pending, except that the Supreme Court shall not require the application of such
rule to further proceedings then pending to the extent that, in the opinion of the
court in which such proceedings are pending, the application of such rule in such
proceedings would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the
former rule applies.
(b) Any such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall
have no force or effect unless approved by Act of Congress.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2074a-2074b (2001).
15. This phrase was voluntarily recited to me by literally every member of the
Advisory Committee with whom I spoke in the early 1990's.
16. For example, FED. R. EVID. 704(b), adopted by Congress after President Reagan
was shot, which precludes opinions on certain mental states or conditions of a criminal
defendant; FED. R. EVID. 413-15, character evidence rules that are directed to specific
types of crimes that generally are not prosecuted in federal courts (which the Advisory
Committee had previously refused to adopt when they were proposed by Congressional
sponsors); Article III, presumption rules that were changed by Congress after the
Advisory Committee proposed a different theory; FED.R. EVID. 803(8)(B), the hearsay
exception for government records of matters observed by law enforcement officials, into
which troublesome language was added during the Congressional debates.
17. See letter from Peter G. McCabe, supra, fa. 10.
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The "wait and see" approach is arguably necessary in situations
where a rule gives broad discretion to trial judges. However, general
use of the approach generates the uncertainty and inconsistency that
the Evidence Code was enacted to reduce.
As a consequence, the current Advisory Committee, generally,
has addressed only minor rule changes-such as inserting a new word
or clause into an existing rule. Members informally have discouraged
broader proposals, like those in the 350-page Evidence Project
Report. i8 At the beginning of the Evidence Project, one Committee
member warned that such comprehensive proposals "would not be
given serious consideration."1 9 A former member confirmed that such
proposals likely would be "rejected out of hand."'
A third major problem with the Advisory Committee's
involvement with the Code is that, even after observing how trial
judges cope with rule problems, the Committee has taken no
immediate action.2' For a 'wait and see' approach to work effectively,
the Evidence Code would need to give explicit authority to trial
judges to override or ignore the rules. The language of Rule 102,
which states, "[t]hese rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the
end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined" is simply too ambiguous. Judges cannot exercise broad
18. 171 F.R.D. 330 (1997).
19. Telephone conversation with Mr. Gregory Joseph, former member, Federal Rules
of Evidence Advisory Committee (May 1996).
20. Telephone conversation with Judge Ralph Winter, former Chairperson, Federal
Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee (May 23, 1996). See also, the comments of Judge
Fern Smith during the panel discussion. She indicated that scholarship, like the Evidence
Project Report, would be given more serious attention if it were supported by established
organizations. Without such backing, it was given little consideration, as Judge Winter
and Mr. Joseph had predicted. The Evidence Project Report was summarily rejected by
the Advisory Committee. Before the Report was finalized and formally submitted for
consideration, it was officially rejected in toto on the basis of drafts that had been sent to
the Committee as a courtesy throughout the Project's work on the Report. Letter from
Peter G. McCabe, supra, note 10. Without notice or opportunity to be heard on any issue,
the work of more than forty people over a period of two years had been rejected by the
Reporter for the Advisory Committee. This was done without even informing the
members of the Committee of the work of the Evidence Project or the existence of the
Report.
21. For example, after virtually all courts had applied FED. R. EVID. 407, Remedial
Measures, to product liability cases in which "negligence or culpable conduct" (the
restrictive language of the rule) had not been proven, the Advisory Committee waited for
years to change the language of the rule to conform to accepted practice. After a judicial
consensus arose, apparently the Committee concluded that a problem requiring their
immediate action no longer existed.
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authority with any assurance appellate courts will agree with them.'
The Committee's members are expecting trial judges to exercise more
authority than they are willing to exercise.
Of course, if this authority were explicitly given to trial judges, it
would undercut the benefits derived from codification--consistency
and predictability. The fact that this authority is not specifically
granted under the current "wait and see" practice, only serves to
make both the code and the "wait and see" approach less effective.
Judges unwilling to exercise broad authority are not accurately
reflecting their views about the rules through their decisions, and the
judges who are willing to pursue just results, despite the language of
the rules, are creating the undesirable inconsistencies.
The fourth problem with the Committee is that it has shown a
tendency to act like an inferior court to the Supreme Court, rather
than as an independent rule-making body. This is probably because
judges predominate on the Advisory Committee with the Chief
Justice being responsible for the appointment of each member.
When the Supreme Court interprets an evidence rule, its decision
does not restrict the Advisory Committee. The Committee can
change the Court's result by changing the rule. Rather than
reassessing the rule to give more clarity and direction, however, the
Committee tends merely to codify the language of the Supreme
Court's decision.'
22. An example of a court needing to assume broad authority to rewrite a defective
rule (a rule which, by the way, has never been addressed by the Advisory Committee) is
United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In Smith the court ignored the
limiting clause in FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(B), making factual observation of government
officials in government records totally inadmissible in criminal cases, and construed it to
be the same as the limiting clause in subsection (C), which permits factual findings to be
offered against the government.
23. The recent revisions to FED. R. EVID. 702 are an excellent example. Rather than
sponsoring a public debate over whether the test announced in Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013 (1923) (requiring general acceptance in the relevant scientific field), or some test
other than that announced in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993), is the appropriate standard for screening expert opinions on scientific matters, the
Committee codified the ambiguous language of Daubert-amending the rule to require
"testimony... sufficiently based upon reliable facts," "testimony [that] is the product of
reliable principles," and "methods reliably [applied] to the facts." From the limited
knowledge that members of the bar have of the Advisory Committee's work, it appears
the Committee gave no serious consideration to rewriting, completely, FED. R. EvID. 702
and 703.
Another example is co-conspirator admissions in FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). Prior
to the Supreme Court decision in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), all
circuits had concluded that the common-law requirement that the existence of the
conspiracy and the defendant's participation in it had to be established with evidence
independent of the content of the statement in question. The Supreme Court disagreed,
holding that the preliminary decisions could be influenced by the content of the statement
in question. While the Advisory Committee did address the question left open in
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It is critical that the Advisory Committee become concerned
about preparing the Rules for the future rather than simply
remedying deficiencies from the past. Since the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, presumptions have been a looming
problem because of the limited effect they have been given in Article
111.24 More importantly, Article III fails to codify a single common-
law presumption. Does this mean that all common-law presumptions
have been abolished? This was the Supreme Court's conclusion with
regard to the Frye "general acceptance" test for determining the
admissibility of scientific evidence,' and the independent evidence
requirement for determining the admissibility of co-conspirator
admissions. 26 Because they were not explicitly adopted when the rule
was codified, the common-law restrictions were found to have been
abandoned. If, contrary to the above results, the Supreme Court
concludes that presumptions have been silently perpetuated, do trial
judges continue to have the authority to modify presumptions to
accommodate e-commerce issues? Do judges have the power to
create new presumptions? This presumption quandary leads to
authentication concerns.
Bouraily, whether the disputed statement alone could satisfy this burden, there is no
indication that the Committee seriously considered revising the Rule to, explicitly, adopt
the common-law restriction that the Court said had been rejected.
Prior to the creation of the Advisory Committee, its predecessor took such action
after the Supreme Court held in Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 526
(1989) that FED. R. EVID. 403 did not modify FED. R. EVID. 609. The Civil Procedure
Advisory Committee changed Rule 609 to incorporate explicitly that modification.
24. While the rule adopts the "bursting bubble" theory of presumptions, courts have
never been satisfied with the limited role this assigns to the presumptions. As a
consequence, courts have employed presumptions in very inconsistent ways. In many
respects, the practice has been more consistent with the rejected Morgan/McCormick
theory of presumptions that shifts the burden of persuasion. See PAUL R. RICE, BEST-
KEPT SECRETS OF EVIDENCE LAW: 101 PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, AND PITFALLS 215-218
(2001).
25. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923), in which the court promulgated
the test for determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence: "general acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs." Although the standard for determining the
admissibility of such evidence was not specifically addressed in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, or discussed in the accompanying Advisory Committee's Notes, in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993), the Court held that the
standard had been changed. "General acceptance" in the relevant science was no longer a
prerequisite to admissibility.
26. Under the co-conspirator admissions rule, it had long been the accepted rule that
such statements were not admissible unless evidence, independent of the statement in
question, established the existence of the conspiracy and the defendant's participation in
it. While perpetuating the common-law co-conspirator admission in Rule 801(d)(2)(E),
both the rule and the accompanying Advisory Committee's Notes were silent on the
independent evidence requirement. In Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), the
Court held the requirement, silently, had been abolished.
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With e-commerce, authenticating evidence taken from the
Internet is going to be the most pressing issue. This issue is going to
be compounded because common circumstantial methods of
authentication have been premised on presumptions. For example, a
reply letter was accepted as authentic because once it was shown that
the original letter was properly addressed, stamped and posted, it was
presumed that the letter was delivered to the addressee.'
Authenticity was sufficiently assured when the reply referred to the
original letter and was received by the original sender in the due
course of the mail." Can the same reply doctrine work with e-mail
communications? How does an enterprise authenticate an e-mail
communication as having been sent by the individual identified in the
communication? Self-identification, standing alone, has never been
considered adequate.29 If, however, the Internet Service Provider can
provide convincing evidence that the communication came from a
computer terminal owned or controlled by a particular individual, can
courts recognized a presumption that it was sent or authorized by that
individual?
Because the evidence rules are no longer evolving on a case-by-
case basis, as they did under the common law,' the legislative or
quasi-legislative body responsible for their maintenance must be
conscious of its responsibility in this regard. Purposeful evolution of
the Code can only result from its regular reassessment and a
willingness, on the part of the Committee, to consider more than
minor change."
27. McCormick on Evidence § 343 (4th Ed. West 1999).
28. IL
29. L at § 226.
30. Although judges interpret and apply the rules of evidence on a case-by-case basis,
those decisions do not factor into the evolution of the statutory rule until the Advisory
Committee decides that a problem needing its attention exists and elects to address that
problem. Under the common law, judges did not have the option of ignoring an
evidentiary problem until they were prepared to address it.
31. In this regard, it is telling that the one area of evidence law left to development
under common-law principles-Article V, Privileges-has continued to evolve in federal
courts, while progressive state jurisdictions, like California, restricted by evidence codes
have begun to fall behind the curve. The best example of this is the fiduciary duty
exception to the attorney-client privilege. This has evolved through federal case law since
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, while the courts of California (where the
rules predate the federal rules) no longer have the power to recognize such a doctrine.
See, e.g., Dickerson v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1st Dist. 1982):
Citing [Garner v. Wolfingbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir. 1970)], [r]eal
parties in interest urge this court to recognize a new nonstatutory exception to
the attorney-client privilege. In Garner, the United States Court of Appeals held
the privilege to be qualified in cases where a corporation was in litigation against
its own stockholders. Under the Garner rule, availability of the attorney-client
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Because Congress has delegated these procedural matters to the
Judicial Conference, members of Congress have generally washed
their hands of responsibility for maintaining the various Codes.
Members of Congress with legal training and some awareness of the
intricacies of the Evidence Code, typically are reluctant to involve
themselves in rule-making issues because they will reap no political
benefit by revising problem rules. Moreover, with the exception of
politically charged situations such as the attempted assassination of
President Reagan, which resulted in the enactment of Rule 704(b),'
or the cheap attempts to curry favor with voters by passing rules that
demonstrate how tough they are on criminals, which produced the
Rules 413-15,' 3 members of Congress have not sponsored legislation
that requires them to have greater knowledge of and involvement in
the regular maintenance of the various procedural codes.
This reluctance on the part of members of Congress is probably
wise, but it only adds to the need for the Advisory Committee to
privilege to the corporation is "subject to the right of the stockholders to show
cause why it should not be invoked in the particular instance." [Id. at 1103-04].
The Garner court was empowered to create this new exception by rule 501 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence (28 U.S.C.) which provides that the rules of
privilege "shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience." This rule provides federal courts "'... with the flexibility to
develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis."' [Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980).] The courts of this state, however, are not free to create
new privileges as a matter of judicial policy and must apply only those which
have been created by statute. [citation omitted]. Such an action on the part of
the courts is similarly precluded, however, because the area of privilege "is one
of the few instances where the Evidence Code precludes the courts from
elaborating upon statutory scheme." (Evid. Code, § 911, comment.)
... Specifically, there is no language in the statute which justifies a distinction
between corporate clients in suit against their shareholders and other clients in
different circumstances. Indeed, corporations are given the same privilege as
natural persons. [citation omitted]. Thus although the rule of Garner v.
Wolfinbarger... may be a desirable means of preventing abuse of the attorney-
client privilege by corporate fiduciaries, this court cannot properly alter the
legislative scheme by adopting such a nonstatutory exception. In the absence of
an applicable statutory exception to the privilege, respondent court's order
compelling answers must be held a violation of the corporation's attorney-client
privilege.
See also Wells Fargo Bank v. Super. Ct., 990 P.2d 591,591 (Cal. 2000).
See generally, PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIvILEGE: STATE LAW,
California § 8:21 (2001). Until the issue of the role of the Advisory Committee has been
resolved, and the Committee has demonstrated a willingness to engage in evidence law
reform, it would be a mistake to codify privilege rules. Under the Committee's current
approach to rule maintenance, it would be a set-back to evolution of principles that has
been experienced under the continuing reign of the common law.
32. Excluding expert opinions on certain mental states of criminal defendants.
33. Permitting the introduction of similar sexual conduct evidence.
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assume a more active role in maintaining the viability of the Evidence
Code. The harsh reality is that, if the Advisory Committee does not
actively attend to the future of the evidence rules, no one who has the
authority to change the rules will do so.
The Advisory Committee, therefore, has been delegated the
responsibility previously borne by the entire judiciary under the
common law. If the Committee does not carry its burden, without
question this would be the most significant failure in the current
codified system of evidence rules.
1II. The Structural Problem
Because all members of the Advisory Committee are beholden
to the Chief Justice for their appointments, the Chief Justice's desires
shape, to a large extent, the activities of the Committee. The Chief
Justice has made it clear to new chairpersons that he does not want
the Committee to engage in law reforn-he wants minimal
revisions, only those changes needed to resolve pressing problems.
Because the quasi-legislative process of the Advisory Committee is
replacing the diversity of the common-law system, the Chief Justice's
influence, either directly or indirectly through his choice of
appointees, is too pervasive. Indeed, the control the Chief Justice
exerts may well be the primary factor behind the Advisory
Committee's failure to act, despite glaring inconsistencies in the
current Evidence Code.
IV. Proposals
A. The Advisory Committee's Interpretation of Its Legislative Mandate
Must Be More Expansive
It is necessary that the Advisory Committee construe its
legislative mandate consistent with the legislative responsibilities that
have been delegated to the Committee. Law reform is consistent with
maintaining a procedural code when the existing procedures are
inadequate, incomplete and inconsistent. The Committee's current
narrow interpretation of its legislative mandate seems little more than
an excuse to avoid the time commitment, responsibilities, and risks
that law reform entails. Perhaps only an amendment to the Rules
Enabling Act can change this interpretation.
34. These comments were made in separate telephone conversations between me and
two prior chairpersons of the Advisory Committee. Judge Ralph Winter (June 1996);
Judge Fern Smith (Oct. 1996).
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B. The Advisory Committee Should Adopt a Statement of Intent
Regarding the Interpretation of Rules That Have Followed Common-
Law Principles Without Explicitly Adopting or Rejecting the Common-
Law Restrictions on Those Principles
In a number of instances, rules within the Code have adopted
common-law principles without expressly adopting, or even
mentioning in the accompanying Advisory Committee's Notes,
common-law restrictions that universally accompanied them.
Examples include: co-conspirator admissions under Rule
801(d)(2)(E) and the common-law requirement that the existence of
the conspiracy and the defendant's participation in it first had to be
established by independent evidence, 5 prior consistent statements
offered to rehabilitate credibility under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and the
common-law requirement that the statement had to be made before
the motive to fabricate arose;36 opinions of experts testifying on the
basis of novel scientific principles under Rule 702 and the common-
law requirement that the scientific principles be "generally accepted"
in the relevant scientific field.' By contrast, when the Advisory
Committee wanted to reject the common-law limitations on habit
evidence-that there be corroboration and no eyewitnesses-Rule
406 explicitly rejected them with the clause "whether corroborated or
not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses."
The Supreme Court has employed a "plain meaning"
interpretation of the Rules, which, in substance has meant "what you
see, is what you get" unless the majority's logic compels a different
result. We saw this in the Court's Bouriaily opinion on co-conspirator
admissions and in its Daubert opinion addressing the standard for
screening scientific evidence. Was this the intent of the drafters? We
35. In Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987) the Supreme Court held the
restrictions were not brought forward with codification. In light of other rules, it was
decided that there was a silent intent to change the common law.
36. In Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995), the Court concluded logic dictated
that the common-law requirement be brought forward.
37. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and Kumho
Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), the Court held all scientific and
technological evidence had to be screened for reliability by the presiding judge and that
the Frye general acceptance test had been abandoned. In substance, the Court held that
there had been a silent revolution.
38. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987) (plain meaning used to
interpret Rule 801(d)(2)(E), co-conspirator admission) and Huddleston v. United States,
485 U.S. 681 (1988) (plain meaning used to interpret Rule 404(b), prior act evidence). See
generally, Becker & Orenstein, supra note 3 at 526-30, Randolph N. Jonakait, The
Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 TEX. L. REV. 745
(1990).
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don't know. The general principles announced in Rule 102" offer no
guidance.
C. Membership on the Committee Should Not Be Controlled by a Single
Person
The power to appoint should be diversified. Appointments to
the Advisory Committee should be made by diverse sources. The fact
that the Chief Justice controls all appointments to the Committee has
been, perhaps, the most debilitating aspect of the Committee process.
His attitude toward the Committee's establishment was negative, and
his view of its responsibilities has been narrow and restrictive. This
may have influenced who he has chosen to appoint, and the
expectations he has voiced to each chairperson.
While the power to appoint Committee members should
continue to reside, predominately, within the federal judiciary (since
the judiciary is the only organization within the active legal profession
that has the knowledge, interest, experience, and credibility to do this
work intelligently, and with the least risk of undue influence by
special interests), each of the twelve regional circuits should receive
one appointment. Such a system would eliminate the undue influence
of a single person, while ensuring the interests, experiences and
problems of every circuit are voiced.
The chairperson of the Committee should be chosen by the
appointed members. The Committee members should control how
the Committee functions. Committee members should choose the
chairperson from within their ranks. That chairperson should
continue to select the Committee's Reporter.
D. Committee Process Should Be More Focused, Transparent and Bar-
Sensitive
While the Committee should always be prepared to address
pressing problems, each year's agenda should focus on specific
Articles in the Code. Once this focus is chosen, it should be
announced to the bench and bar, and focused proposals should be
solicited. The Committee must seek public input before making
proposals. Under current practices, public input is generally sought
39. "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of
unjustifiable expenses and delay, and promotion of growth development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."
FED. R. EVID. 102. This language is so broad it gives no direction. At one extreme the
language could be interpreted as leaving trial judges with their common-law powers to do
justice. Of course, under such an interpretation, the Rules would be only advisory or
suggestive. This, of course, would destroy the consistency that codification attempted to
establish.
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only after the Committee has decided what revisions it wants to enact.
Consequently, the public is placed in a position of having to dissuade
the Committee from taking actions its members have already decided
are necessary and appropriate. Because, historically, the Committee
has rarely changed proposals in response to those comments, such
comments could be seen as futile, and therefore, a waste of time.
To facilitate greater participation in the revision process by both
the bench and bar, the Committee should take a number of actions.
First, in formulating the annual focus of its work, the Committee
should be in contact with members of the AALS Evidence Section to
discuss problems and developing issues. Second, the Committee
should establish an interactive Web page. This would permit the
Committee and members of the bar to communicate more
conveniently with one another.
Third, when proposals are submitted to the Committee, not only
should their receipt be acknowledged, but also initiators should be
contacted when their proposals have been rejected by the Reporter,
with an explanation beyond the boilerplate letter that is currently
employed. The explanation should reveal that the proposal was given
serious consideration at some level in the review process.
Fourth, when proposals are brought to the Committee for formal
consideration (having passed the Reporter's screen), the initiator
should be notified and invited to communicate further with
Committee members to explain the merits of the proposal and to
comment on any alterations being considered.
Fifth, members of the federal judiciary should be polled on every
proposed change. This could be done through accepted sampling
techniques. Currently, such surveys are rarely used. Judges are the
individuals who previously controlled the evolution of the rules and
who still control their interpretation and use. Accordingly, the
greatest input should be sought from these individuals. This could be
done by e-mail, thereby making responding exceptionally convenient
for those judges.
Sixth, at the end of each year, the Reporter should publish on the
Committee's Web page a summary of the proposals that have been
received or considered and the action taken on each.
Conclusion
Because no Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee
existed for 20 years after the adoption of the Evidence Code, and the
current Advisory Committee has been unwilling to address
deficiencies in the initial Code (as well as ill-advised Congressional
revisions thereafter), trial judges have been forced to exercise power
equivalent to what they exercised under the common law. But this
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power is no longer authorized in our codified system.4 Even though
judges continue to have power to interpret and resolve conflicts
within the rules, they do not have the power to amend bad or
inadequate rules, create non-existent rules, resolve conflicts between
rules, and ignore language that is inconsistent with the goals of a
particular rule. The absence of this power was made apparent in two
instances by the Supreme Court. In Green v. Bock Laundry Machine
Co.4' and Bourjaily v. United States,42 respectively, the Court noted
that every circuit was in agreement that Rule 403 modified the use of
prior convictions under Rule 609 (Bock Laundry) and that co-
conspirator admissions under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) could be introduced
at trial only after the existence of the conspiracy and the defendant's
participation in it was established by independent evidence
(Bourjaily). In both instances, the Supreme Court held that the
unanimous interpretations of the evidence rules by the Courts of
Appeals did not change the rules. Even with the standard for
screening novel scientific evidence, the overwhelming majority of
courts agreed that the Frye "general acceptance in the relevant
science" test continued to apply.' 3 The Supreme Court, nevertheless,
rejected this interpretation in Daubert." Even though the judges have
the responsibility for interpreting the rules, their rulings do not cause
them to evolve.
Congress has taken from trial judges their common-law power to
create and amend the evidence rules that drive their proceedings. It
enacted a Code of Evidence and then delegated the responsibility of
maintaining that Code to the Judicial Conference of the United
States. Because of this delegation, members of Congress have
washed their hands of this responsibility-dabbling with the codes on
a limited basis when it is politically expedient. They lack sufficient
40. For example, under the common law, judges imposed a requirement of surprise
and damage when a party was attempting to impeach his own witness with prior
inconsistent statements. Under FED. R. EVID. 607 and 613, a party can impeach his own
witness with prior inconsistent statements. These rules impose no requirement that the
impeaching party be either surprised or damaged. Courts, nevertheless, have imposed a
requirement comparable to "surprise.-"good faith." See, e.g., United States v. Gomez-
Gallardo, 915 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1990), United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.
1984), United States v. DeLillo, 620 F.2d 939 (2nd Cir. 1980), and Whithurst v. Wright, 592
F.2d 834, 839-40 (5th Cir. 1979). Do judges have the authority to do this? Can judges also
impose the additional requirement of "damage?" Another compelling example is
evidence of bias. While general rules of relevance could authorize the admissions of such
evidence, how are judges supposed to deal with the foundation requirement that many
common-law courts followed? Can they impose such a requirement? Should they? What
defines the scope of their authority to structure a new rule?
41. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
42. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).




knowledge of the Code's intricacies to get involved in meaningful law
reform, and because they cannot identify a constituency whose
interests are served by such an effort, even if they had the knowledge,
they lack the motivation.
The Conference, in turn, delegated this responsibility to its
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, which, in turn,
delegated it to the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence. This is a Committee the Chief Justice apparently did not
want, and had to be pressured to appoint its members after the
Conference authorized it over his objections." Because the Chief
Justice appoints all of its members, and has made it clear he wants
minimal activity-that is, nothing he would classify as law reform-
little has been done to address the many needs of the code that have
become apparent over the past thirty years. This inactivity has, in
effect, delegated the responsibility for maintaining the evidence rules
back to the judges from whom it originally was taken. The only
difference is that the judges, who will address evidentiary needs
because they have no choice, no longer have the power they
previously possessed. They are bound by language they cannot
amend. As a consequence, a process has evolved in which no one can
or will do anything of any significance.
If the Advisory Committee continues to take a reserved role in
the evolution of evidentiary principles, and continues to follow the
"wait and see" approach to code maintenance, and if the Judicial
Conference of the United States allowed this abdication of
responsibility, legislation should be sought from Congress that gives
trial judges the express authority to fill the void left by the Advisory
Committee's inaction. Of course, in doing so, Congress would
formally be creating a common-law system that is legislatively driven,
and a legislative structure with a common-law safety valve to
accommodate selective inactivity. This would be a formal recognition
of the Rube Goldberg contraption under which we currently operate.
Postscript
Seldom do current members of the Federal Rules of Evidence
Advisory Committee publicly appear with critics to respond to their
concerns. The panel at the Evidence Section of the AALS
Conference was no exception. However, all panelists, other than me,
had previously served on the Advisory Committee, and Professor
45. "Although the Judicial Conference approved the recommendation [to create a
Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee], the Chief Justice, for reasons we do not
know, never appointed a Committee." See Becker & Orenstein, supra note 3 at 860. Soon
after the Becker & Orenstein article was published, the Advisory Committee was
established.
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Kenneth Broun is currently a consultant to the Committee. Their
comments gave everyone a better understanding of the Committee,
the attitudes of its personnel and their expectations of those who
propose revisions to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Each panelist had been given my paper before the discussion. In
light of their responses to my criticisms of the Advisory Committee
process, and comments on other topics, this postscript is my reply.
My first comment is on Professor Broun's proposal to codify privilege
rules. The remaining comments are addressed to what might be
described as attitudes and expectations of members of the Advisory
Committee as reflected in the statements of Judge Fern Smith, the
former Chairperson of the Advisory Committee, and Gregory Joseph,
a former member.
A. Codification of Privilege Rules
All privilege rules in Article V of the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence were replaced in Congress when it became apparent that
controversial privileges would give rise to protracted debates that
might jeopardize, or at least significantly delay, the adoption of the
entire evidence code. In lieu of specific privilege rules, Rule 501 was
adopted. 6 In substance, this rule leaves the development of all
privilege rules to common-law principles, announced on a case-by-
case basis.
Under common-law principles, a number of new privileges have
been recognized47 and established privileges have continued to
evolve.' s Of course, inconsistencies have been a by-product of this
46. Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil
actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State
law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EvID. 501.
47. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1990) (clergy-
communicant privilege); Bredice v. Doctor Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D. D.C. 1970), aff'd
without opinion, 479 F.2d 920 (1973) (self-critical analysis privilege); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, Dtd. Jan. 4, 1984, 750 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1984) (scholar's privilege); Kientzy v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 133 F.R.D. 570 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (ombudsman privilege); May
v. Collins, 122 F.R.D. 535 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (jouralist/newsgatherer privilege).
48. For example, the attorney-client privilege historically has required
communications between an attorney and client be confidential before the privilege
protects it. However, courts have shown such a willingness to overlook the loss of
confidentiality; it has become a condition precedent to the creation of the privilege but not
a necessary condition for its continuation. As some point it may be appropriate to abolish
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development. Surprisingly, though, there have been far fewer than
one might expect. Professor Broun wants to eliminate these
inconsistencies by renewing the old legislative battle to codify them.
Perhaps the Congressional landscape has sufficiently changed to
alter the likely outcome of a renewed effort to codify. One factor
supporting the attempt is the fact that regardless of how the debate
proceeds, and how much time it consumes, it will no longer jeopardize
the remainder of the Evidence Code. Nevertheless, I believe that the
codification of privilege law is unnecessary and may in fact be
counter-productive in areas like the attorney-client privilege.
Professor Broun convincingly identified some advantages of
codification-clarity, consistency in application and uniformity within
the federal system and among the states when the federal rules are
used as a model. Few would deny that these are the immediate
benefits of bringing privileges back into the codification fold. What
Professor Broun does not address in his article, '9 however, are the
long-term consequences of codification. As I previously discussed, the
Advisory Committee is demonstrably unwilling to address many of
the obvious problems and inadequacies that currently exist under the
evidence rules; in fact, many of these difficulties have existed since
the rules were adopted in 1973. Why should we relegate privilege
rules that are currently vital and dynamic to the Committee's
relatively stagnated process?
Uniformity is not an end in itself. It is desirable only if it does
not sacrifice the long-term benefits-including evolution of the law-
that flow from open and continuous debate. Under the current
leadership of the Advisory Committee process, I fear that codification
will come at the expense of the developments we are currently
witnessing. It may translate into little more than trading uniformity
for the rich public debate we have experienced under Rule 501.
The quasi-legislative process under which we are currently
maintaining the evidence rules has not proven to be more consistent,
efficient or fair in the creation and evolution of evidentiary principles
than the common law that it replaced. The process is influenced by
special interests, involves layer upon layer of bureaucracy and delay,
and shows too little concern for the broad interests and needs of the
jurisprudence given to its custody and care. Indeed, under the
Advisory Committee's 'wait and see' excuse for acting, the
Committee is looking for direction to an unofficial common-law
system.
the requirement altogether. See Paul. R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding
Concept of Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853 (1998).
49. 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769 (2002).
[Vol. 53
PRETENDING FOR THE FUTURE
As a case in point, during the roughly thirty years that the
Federal Rules of Evidence have been in existence, we have seen a
vast expansion of principles relating to the attorney-client privilege.
For example, a fiduciary duty exception50 has been created and widely
adopted throughout the federal and state systems.5 At the same time,
the scope of the new exception has been expanded from shareholder
derivative actions to virtually any context where a fiduciary duty is
owed to the individual seeking access to privileged communications. 2
Based on the track record of the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory
Committee, it is virtually certain that none of this would have
developed through the Committee process. And individual judges,
now willing to be creative when given the discretion under Rule 501,
probably would not have approved of such changes had their
authority to do so been taken away through codification.
During the panel discussion, Judge Smith commented that
"Federal judges tend to do what they want regardless of the
[Evidence] Rules." After thirty years of working with judges,
practicing under judges, and reading literally tens of thousands of
court decisions on evidence law, I have found just the opposite to be
true. The vast majority of judges, both state and federal, appear to
feel obligated to and bound by the literal language of codified
evidence rules unless their application will create an obvious injustice.
While it is true that Rule 102 of the Federal Rules of Evidence gives
broad discretion to judges in interpreting the Rules, 3 if, as Judge
Smith apparently believes, her colleagues exercise the same authority
as they did under the common law, the value of codification would be
50. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
51. See PAUL.R. RICE, ATtORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES, §§
8:17-21 (West Group 2d ed. 1999); PAUL.R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE:
STATE LAW, §§ 8:17-21 (Rice Publishing 2001).
52. Courts have begun to extend the balancing of interests approach to conflicting
interests claims in a variety of fiduciary contexts where the recognition of the privilege
would favor the interests of one principal over the other. Examples include a suit by the
Secretary of Labor against former officials of a pension fund for their violation of their
fiduciary duties; a suit between a limited partner and a general partner in the same general
partnership; actions by union members against union officers; an action by trust
beneficiaries against the trust and its trustee; an action by excess insurers against the
primary insurer; an action by creditors against a bankruptcy creditor's committee; actions
by minority shareholders against majority shareholders; an action by a corporation against
a former executive who, while employed by the plaintiff, formed a competing corporation,
and an action on behalf of a corporation against the law firm that represented the
corporation. PAUL R. RICE, ATORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: STATE LAW, § 822 at 130-
33 (2001).
53. Rule 102 provides: "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth
and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined." FED. R. EVID. 102.
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significantly lost. Even if trial judges were willing to exercise
authority they no longer possessed, they would risk reversal on
appeal. Few judges might want to jeopardize an otherwise valid
judgment for the sake of exercising such questionable power in a
single evidentiary ruling.
At the state level, a case in point is Dickerson v. Superior Court.4
California has codified privilege rules. The court in Dickerson
acknowledged the wisdom of the federal fiduciary duty exception, but
refused to adopt it because the California legislature had not
recognized it.
The Garner court was empowered to create this new exception by
rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (28 U.S.C.) which
provides that the rules of privilege "shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience."
This rule provides federal courts '[W]ith the flexibility to develop
rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis,'...." (Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 47, 100 S. Ct. 906, 911, 60 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1980)).
The courts of this state, however, are not free to create new
privileges as a matter of judicial policy and must apply only those
which have been created by statute.... Such an action on the part
of the courts is similarly precluded, however, because the area of
privilege "is one of the few instances where the Evidence Code
precludes the courts from elaborating on the statutory scheme."'5
Because of the attitudes of those who control the Federal Rules
of Evidence Advisory Committee and the Committee's general
unwillingness to act on controversial rules, codification will likely
repress the types of advancements that we have recently experienced.
Indeed, with our instantaneous world-wide communication of judicial
decisions, it is no longer apparent that codification, in general, is
superior to the development of rules on a case-by-case basis, where
only the equities of a rule's application controls its recognition and
definition. Law by committee, particularly through the
bureaucratized process under the Rules Enabling Act, is inherently
less responsive and vital than the common law that we have been
experiencing.
Rather than going the route of greater codification, we should be
considering changing the evidence rules from a binding code to model
rules that only provide guidance. If Judge Smith is correct in her
assessment that federal judges currently are not inhibited by the
language of the rules, this may be what we informally have now. Of
course, under non-binding model rules, the failure of the Advisory
54. 185 Cal. Rptr. 95 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1982).
55. Id at 100.
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Committee to act would be of little consequence because no one
would be obligated to follow them.
B. Process, Attitudes, and Expectations
While appreciating this opportunity to publicly express and
debate views with those who were central to the creation and revision
of some our evidence rules, I was particularly troubled by comments
from two other panelists. Unfortunately, they were especially
revealing regarding past, and perhaps current, expectations and
attitudes of the membership of the Advisory Committee. The first
comment was by Judge Fern Smith."
Generally referring to articles that I have written criticizing the
Committee's actions, and proposing alternative courses, Judge Smith
remarked that such scholarship would receive more serious attention
if its proposals were supported by organizations like interested
sections of the American Bar Association, the Defense Research
Institute, and the American Trial Lawyers Association. Apparently
defending Professor Capra's summary rejection of the Evidence
Project Report (which identified inconsistencies and proposed
revisions), Judge Smith suggested that proposals not having such
backing can summarily be dismissed because they are facially
undeserving, or at least less deserving, of critical examination. While
wide support for a proposal may be evidence of its value, the absence
of documented support may be due only to the failure to seek public
reaction. And even when broad public support is sought but is not
forthcoming, this cannot reasonably be construed as reflecting
negatively on either the need for or validity of the proposal.
Otherwise, the Advisory Committee would regularly have to
withdraw most of its proposed revisions: negligible public comment
during their notice and comment periods has been the rule rather
than the exception.
If membership on the Advisory Committee is based on
experience with the Federal Rules of Evidence, an abiding interest in
their maintenance, and a willingness to devote the time necessary to
complete the work that needs to be accomplished, its membership
should be able to assess the validity of a proposal without being told
by another organization that it is legitimate. This is particularly true
at the initial screening of proposals by the Committee's reporter,
because that position has always been filled by an accomplished
professor of evidence.
The purpose of the public notice and comment period is to
acquire and assess the views of interested organizations. To compel
56. Judge Smith was a former Chairperson of the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory
Committee and currently is the Director of the Federal Judicial Center.
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proponents of proposals to come to the Advisory Committee with
part of the Committee's work already done, would sacrifice the needs
of the evidence code to the bureaucracies, special interests and biases
of organizations and their leadership whose goals may not be
consistent with the need to maintain the fairness and efficiency of the
evidence rules. I dare say the Committee has never imposed that
same obligation on proposed revisions that its own reporter,
members, or consultants have brought forward.' It is inappropriate
to impose a different standard simply because the reporter does not
endorse either the proposal or its proponent. To the detriment of the
Advisory Committee's work, its process appears to have become one
of politics and personalities, where personal interests and biases of
individuals hold sway over the interests and needs of the evidence
code.
The second troublesome remark was from Mr. Gregory Joseph
The moderator, Professor Eileen Scallen, had noted a number of
controversies that existed around numerous evidence rules and was
attempting to expand the discussion by proposing that a solution
might be to abandon the evidence code and return to the common
law. Before completing her question, Mr. Joseph interjected that the
solution would be "to let forty-five second year law students at
American University rewrite the rules." His remark was directed to
the work of the law students on the Evidence Project, most of whom
were third-year students when they participated. 9 At the earlier
57. One wonders whether Professor Broun be required to have this support before his
proposed codification of privilege rules is taken seriously?
58. Mr. Joseph is a practicing attorney in New York and a former member of the
Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee.
59. A number of criticisms Mr. Gregory Joseph made of my article were unclear, mis-
characterizing my positions. At one point, he appeared to challenge my comments about
the unwillingness of Congress to get involved in day to day maintenance of the Evidence
Code. His comments, however, curiously seemed to reinforce my point. In addition, the
examples of Congressional activities vis-a-vis the Evidence Rules he offered not only
demonstrated my point about sporadic congressional actions, and then only in situations
where it was politically expedient, but also one of his examples demonstrated the
unwillingness of the Advisory Committee to act on critical problems that have plagued the
Evidence Code since its adoption.
More specifically, his first attempt to refute my claim was directed at the pressure
Congress brought to bear on the Advisory Committee to address the problem of screening
scientific evidence. Congress applied this pressure because its members were influenced
by special interest groups to promulgate a restrictive rule, not unlike the Frye general
acceptance in the relevant science test, that would protect corporate defendants, many of
whom were substantial contributors to congressional campaigns. Of course, this was the
type of special situation to which I referred. And, as Mr. Joseph noted, Congress
ultimately delegated the work to the Advisory Committee, which was willing to act only in
response to Congressional pressure. If the Evidence Rules had been properly maintained,
such problems would have been addressed and resolved long before boiling over into
political issues.
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stages of the Project when most of the work was accomplished,
virtually all were on one of the school's journals, and many were
editors. These individuals devoted thousands of hours to the work of
the Evidence Project over a period of more than two years. The goal
of the Evidence Project was not to "rewrite the rules" and resolve all
disputes about their interpretation, but simply to identify and propose
revisions to correct inconsistencies within the evidence code. These
inconsistencies occur between language and principles within rules,
between the rules and practice, and between the Constitution and the
roles of participants in the adjudicatory processes in which the rules
are employed. Surely, someone with Mr. Joseph's experience must
know that third year law students, particularly the most successful
with law review training, have the ability to do this work without the
practical experience that he has acquired.
Just as proposals should not be summarily rejected because they
do not come to the Advisory Committee with organizational backing,
they also should not be rejected because of the identity of their
authors.6' The entire membership of the Advisory Committee should
Next, for reasons that were unclear, Mr. Joseph also mentioned the character
evidence rules, Rules 413-15, that Professor Scallen and I had just discussed. Here again,
the involvement of Congress was limited, and designed to give the appearance that those
who supported the sexual offender rules were tought on the kind of crimes of concern to
voters.
The point of Mr. Joseph's next challenge was equally unclear. After I responded to a
question by Professor Scallen about the disinterest of congressmen in the evidence code,
absent situations in which an identifiable political advantage exists, Mr. Joseph mockingly
injected the rhetorical question that Congress "won't get involved when, for example,
from your article, the question is whether the ancient document rule ought to be in Rule
803 or 801?" Indeed, Congress would not get involved in such matters, but that was not
my point in mentioning the ancient document exception in my article, and Mr. Joseph
undoubtedly knew that. My point about that exception was simply that the original
Advisory Committee's reason for eliminating admissions from the definition of hearsay-
the fact that their use is not premised on their inherent reliability (like most exceptions),
but rather is based on the adversarial nature of the litigation process-was not consistently
followed. The ancient document exception, for example, is premised on necessity, not
reliability, and it remains hearsay. Indeed, I do not believe that either admissions or
ancient documents should be eliminated from the definition of hearsay by being moved to
Rule 801(d). Mr. Joseph's distortion in this instance is emblematic of the manner in which
the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee has reviewed the work of the
Evidence Project-that is, seeking to evade scholarly critique, rather than consider it.
60. In this same vein, Professor Broun remarked during the panel discussion that
Congress may not be getting involved with the Evidence Code because the changes the
Evidence Project was proposing are based on little more than the fact that "those evidence
rules don't teach as well as they otherwise could, that our students have trouble
understanding them." Revising rules simply because students don't understand them is
certainly an absurd reason for change, but when rules are not understandable because they
make little sense, like the assertive/nonassertive distinction in Rule 801(a), and the courts
apply the distinction to words as well as conduct (thereby destroying the only justification
for making the absurd distinction in the first instance), the rule needs to be changed. The
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be thanking these former students, applauding them for their work
and commitment, so as to encourage further public service during
their careers in practice. Instead, they are being derided, simply to
divert attention from the documented inadequacies of the Advisory
Committee during Mr. Joseph's tenure.
The attitude expressed by Mr. Joseph was mean-spirited and
uninformed. It was particularly alarming and inappropriate for
someone of his experience and influence. On the Advisory
Committee this kind of exclusionary elitism has produced practices
and policies discouraging the broad public participation that its
members so often lament. Professor Capra's summary rejection, as
the Committee's reporter, of the lengthy Evidence Project Report (1)
before it was formally submitted for consideration, (2) without notice
that it was being reviewed, (3) without distributing it to the entire
membership of the Committee, and (4) without any opportunity for
those who had worked on it so diligently to respond to questions or
address specific concerns, is evidence that Mr. Joseph's comment
reflects an attitude that may be shared within the Advisory
Committee.61 Unchecked, this attitude does not bode well for the
Advisory Committee process in the future. Such attitudes hasten the
politicization of a rule-making process that is already too heavily
controlled by the narrow, restrictive philosophies of Chief Justice
Rehnquist.
suggestion that the proposals made by the Evidence Project are premised on such trivial
grounds, simply because students manned the project, demonstrates that the Evidence
Project's Report may not have been seriously read and considered by anyone on the
Advisory Committee.
61. I hope that Professor Capra actually read the Evidence Project Report before it
was tossed aside because it contained many of the inconsistencies that he later identified in
a report for the Federal Judicial Center entitled "Case Law Divergence from the Federal
Rules of Evidence," Federal Judicial Center (2000). If he produces additional reports on
inconsistencies it should be a valuable resource.
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